Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to allow processing data at the edge of the network, where data is typically generated and collected by exploiting multiple devices at the edge collectively. However, offloading tasks to other devices leaves the edge computing applications at the complete mercy of an attacker. One of the attacks, which is the focus of this work, is Byzantine attacks, where one or more devices can corrupt the offloaded tasks. Furthermore, exploiting the potential of edge computing is challenging mainly due to the heterogeneous and time-varying nature of the devices at the edge. In this paper, we develop a secure coded cooperative computation mechanism () that provides both security and computation efficiency guarantees by gracefully combining homomorphic hash functions and coded cooperative computation. Homomorphic hash functions are used against Byzantine attacks and coded cooperative computation is used to improve computation efficiency when edge resources are heterogeneous and time-varying. Simulation results show that improves task completion delay significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to allow processing data at the edge of the network, where data is typically generated and collected. This paradigm advocates offloading tasks from an edge device to other edge/end devices including mobile devices, and/or servers in close proximity. Edge computing can be used in Internet of Things (IoT) applications which connects an exponentially increasing number of devices, including smartphones, wireless sensors, and health monitoring devices at the edge. Many IoT applications require processing the data collected by these devices through computationally intensive algorithms with stringent reliability, security and latency constraints. In many scenarios, these algorithms cannot be run locally on computationally-limited IoT-devices.
One of the existing solutions to handle computationallyintensive tasks is computation offloading, which advocates offloading tasks to remote servers or to cloud computing platforms. Yet, offloading tasks to remote servers or to the cloud could be a luxury that cannot be afforded by most edge applications, where connectivity to remote servers can be expensive, energy consuming, lost or compromised. In addition, offloading tasks to remote servers may not be efficient in terms of delay, especially when data is generated and collected at the edge. This makes edge computing a promising solution to handle computationally-intensive tasks, where a task is divided into sub-tasks and each sub-task is offloaded to an edge device for computation.
However, offloading tasks to other devices leaves the edge computing applications at the complete mercy of an attacker. One of the attacks, which is the focus of this work, is Byzantine attacks, where one or more devices (workers) can corrupt the offloaded tasks. Furthermore, exploiting the potential of edge computing is challenging mainly due to the heterogeneous and time-varying nature of the devices at the edge. Thus, our goal is to develop a secure, dynamic, and heterogeneity-aware edge computing mechanism that provides both security and computation efficiency guarantees.
Our key tool is the graceful use of coded cooperative computation and homomorphic hash functions. Coded computation advocates mixing data in computationally-intensive tasks by employing erasure codes and offloading these coded tasks to other devices for computation [1] - [13] . The following canonical example demonstrates the effectiveness of coded computation.
Example 1: Consider the setup where a master device wishes to offload a task to 3 workers. The master has a large data matrix A and wants to compute matrix vector product Ax. The master device divides the matrix A row-wise equally into two smaller matrices A 1 and A 2 , which are then encoded using a (3, 2) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code 1 to give B 1 = A 1 , B 2 = A 2 and B 3 = A 1 +A 2 , and sends each to a different worker. Also, the master device sends x to workers and asks them to compute B i x, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. When the master receives the computed values (i.e., B i x) from at least two out of three workers, it can decode its desired task, which is the computation of Ax. The power of coded computations is that it makes B 3 = A 1 + A 2 act as a "joker" redundant task that can replace any one of the other two tasks if a worker ends up straggling, i.e., being slow or unresponsive.
This example demonstrates the benefit of coding for edge computing. However, the very nature of task offloading to workers makes the computation framework vulnerable to attacks. We focus on Byzantine attacks in this work. For example, if workers 1 and 3 in Example 1 corrupt B 1 x and B 3 x, the master can only obtain a wrong value of Ax. Thus, it is crucial to develop a secure coded computation mechanism for edge devices against this type of attacks.
In this paper, we develop a secure coded cooperative computation () mechanism which uses homomorphic hash functions. Example 2 illustrates the main idea of homomorphic hash functions in coded computation.
Example 2: Consider the same setup of Example 1, and assume that worker i returns the computed valueỹ i to the master device. If worker i is an honest worker,ỹ i = B i x holds. The master device checks the integrity ofỹ i by calculating its hash function h(ỹ i ), where h is a homomorphic hash function. (The details of the homomorphic hash function which we use will be provided in Section II.) The master also calculates h(B i x) using its local information, i.e., using h(x) and B i . If the master finds that h(ỹ i ) = h(B i x), it concludes that the computed value is corrupted. Otherwise, it is declared as verified.
The above example shows how homomorphic hash functions can be used for coded computation. However, existing hash-based solutions [14] , [15] introduce high computational overhead, which is not suitable for edge applications, where computation power and energy are typically limited. In this paper, we use homomorphic hash functions and coded computation gracefully and efficiently. In particular, we develop and analyze light-weight and heavy-weight integrity check tools for coded computation using homomorphic hash functions. We design by exploiting both light-and heavy-weight tools. The following are the key contributions of this work:
• We use a homomorphic hash function as in [15] and show that the hash of a linear combination of computed values can be constructed by the hashes of the original tasks. • We develop light-and heavy-weight integrity check tools for coded computation, and analyze these tools in terms of computation complexity and attack detection probability. We also analyze the trade-off between using lightand heavy-weight tools for different number of tasks. • We design by exploiting light-and heavy-weight tools.
If an attack is detected, can pinpoint which tasks are corrupted. • We evaluate for different number and strength of malicious (Byzantine) workers. The simulation results show that our algorithm significantly improves task completion delay as compared to the baseline. The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section II presents our system model. Section III presents lightand heavy-weight integrity check tools. Section IV presents our secure coded cooperative computation () mechanism. Section V provides simulation results of . Section VI presents related work. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Setup. We consider a master/worker setup at the edge of the network, where the master device offloads its computationally intensive tasks to workers w n , n ∈ N (where |N | = N ) via device-to-device (D2D) links such as Wi-Fi Direct and/or Bluetooth. The master device divides a task into smaller subtasks, and offloads them to parallel processing workers.
Task Model. Our focus is on computation of linear functions; i.e., the master device would like to compute the multiplication of matrix A with vector
, and F ψ is a finite field. The motivation of focusing on linear functions stems from matrix multiplication applications where computing linear functions is a building block of several iterative algorithms such as gradient descent.
Coding. We divide matrix A into R rows denoted by A i , i = 1, . . . , R. The master device applies Fountain coding [16] - [18] across rows to create coded information packets
is the overhead required by Fountain coding 2 , and γ i,j ∈ {0, 1} are coding coefficients of Fountain coding and the information packet q j is a row vector with size C. Rateless coding enabled by Fountain codes is compatible with our goal to deal with heterogeneity and time-varying nature of resources. In other words, coded packets are generated on the fly and transmitted to workers depending on the amount of their resources (as described in Section IV-A) and Fountain codes are flexible to achieve this goal.
Worker & Attack Model. The workers incur random delays while executing the task assigned to them by the master device. The workers have different computation and communication specifications resulting in a heterogeneous environment which includes workers that are significantly slower than others, known as stragglers. Moreover, the workers cannot be trusted by the master. In particular, we consider Byzantine attacks, where one or more workers can corrupt the tasks that are assigned to them.
Homomorphic Hash Function. We consider the following hash function that maps a large number a to an output with much smaller size
where q is a prime number selected randomly from the field F φ , r is a prime number that satisfies q|(r − 1) (i.e., r − 1 is divisible by q) and g is a number in F r which is calculated as g = b (r−1)/q for a random selection of b ∈ F r , b = 1 [14] , [15] . The defined hash function is a collision-resistant hash function with the property that when φ increases, a is compressed less; i.e., h(a) becomes a better approximation of a for larger φ. However, the computational cost of calculating h(a) increases for larger φ. Thus, there is a trade-off between computational complexity and better approximation of a in calculating h(a). Our goal is to exploit this trade-off in the context of coded computation as described in the next sections. Another property of the defined hash function is homomorphism, i.e., h( i c i a i ) = i h(a i ) ci , which we will exploit in matrix-vector multiplication (in Section III). Delay Model. Each packet transmitted from the master to a worker w n , n = 1, 2, ..., N experiences the following delays: (i) transmission delay for sending the packet from the master to the worker, (ii) computation delay for computing the multiplication of the packet by the vector x, and (iii) transmission delay for sending the computed packet from the worker w n back to the master. We denote by β n,i the computation time of the i th packet at worker n.
III. LIGHT-AND HEAVY-WEIGHT INTEGRITY CHECK TOOLS FOR CODED COMPUTATION
In this section we present how homomorphic hash functions considered in [14] , [15] and defined in (1) are used gracefully with coded computation. We first show that (1) can be applied to coded computation. Then, we develop light-and heavyweight integrity check tools. The tools we develop in this section will be building blocks of our secure coded cooperative computation mechanism ().
A. Homomorphic Hash Function for Coded Computation
Let us consider that Z n coded information packets are offloaded to worker w n . The i th packet offloaded to w n is p n,i ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q R+ }, which can be represented as p n,i = (p n,i,1 , . . . , p n,i,C ), where p n,i,j is the j th element of vector p n,i . Worker w n calculates y n,i = p n,i x and sends it back to the master device.
Assume that the master receivesỹ n,i from w n , whereỹ n,i = y n,i if packet is not corrupted. The master device checks the integrity of packets calculated at w n according to the following rule. First, it calculates
using the hash function defined in (1), where c i 's are coefficients (we will discuss how c i is selected later in this section.) Next, it calculates
where x j is the j th element of vector x, and q and r are the parameters of the hash function defined in (1) . β n in (3) is calculated by the master device using its local data p n,i and x. β n is used to check α n as described in the next theorem. Theorem 1: If w n does not corrupt packets, i.e.,ỹ n,i = y n,i , ∀i, and c i is a nonzero integer, then α n = β n holds. Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] .
We note that Theorem 1 is necessary, but not sufficient condition to determine if w n is malicious or not. The sufficiency condition depends on how c i is selected as explained next.
B. Light-Weight Integrity Check (LW Function)
The light-weight integrity check (LW function) uses Theorem 1 to determine if workers corrupt packets or not. In particular, LW function calculates α n in (2) and β n in (3) by selecting c i randomly and uniformly from {−1, 1}. LW function concludes that packets processed by w n are not corrupted if α n = β n . However, as we discussed earlier, this condition is not always a sufficient condition, so LW function detects attacks with some probability, which is provided next.
1) Probability of Attack Detection: We first consider a pairwise Byzantine attack, where malicious worker w n corrupts two packets out of Z n packets by adding and subtracting terms. For example,ỹ n,i = y n,i + δ i andỹ n,j = y n,j − δ j , for any arbitrary i,j ≤ Z n satisfying i = j. In this attack pattern, if |δ i | = |δ j |, and considering that the coefficients are selected from {−1, 1} in LW function, the attack is detected with 100% probability. On the other hand, if the attack is symmetric, i.e., |δ i | = |δ j |, the probability of detecting the attack is 50%. As symmetrical attacks are the most difficult ones to detect, we focus on this scenario in the next lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider an attack where the malicious worker w n selects an even numberZ n randomly out of Z n packets and corrupt them by adding δ to half of them, and subtracting δ from the other half. The probability of attack detection by LW function is
Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] . As seen from Lemma 2, the probability of attack detection increases with increasing number of corrupted packets. This result intuitively holds for any attack pattern as the coefficients (c i ) are selected randomly for each packet and estimating these values by an attacker becomes difficult for larger set of corrupted packets. Another attack pattern and its detection probability are provided in our technical paper [19] .
Lemma 3: The probability of attack detection when LW function is used and for any attack pattern is lower bounded by P LW detect ≥ 0.5. Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] .
2) Computational Complexity: Theorem 4: The computational complexity of LW function for checking Z n packets calculated by w n is O(CM (r) log 2 q), where C is the size of each information packet, M (r) is the complexity of multiplication in F r , and r and q are the parameters of the hash function defined in (1) .
Proof: The complexity of LW function consists of two parts; calculation of α n in (2) and β n in (3). We first analyze computational complexity of calculating α n . The sum Zn i=1 c iỹn,i only has addition and subtraction as c i ∈ {−1, 1}, and can be ignored. The complexity of the modular exponentiation while calculating the hash function is O(M (r) log 2 q) by using the method of exponentiation by squaring.
Similarly, we can calculate the computational complexity of calculating β n . The complexity for computing Zn i=1 c i p n,i,j corresponds to the complexity of addition and subtraction, which is negligible. The complexity of computing mod ( C j=1 h(x j ) mod ( Zn i=1 cipn,i,j ,q) , r) has two components: (i) Calculating the modular exponentiations h(x j ) mod ( Zn i=1 cipn,i,j ,q) , ∀j = 1, 2, ..., C: The complexity for this calculation is O(M (r) log 2 q) for one modular exponentiation and O(CM (r) log 2 q) for all C modular exponentiations. (ii) Multiplying all the calculated modular expo-nentiations, i.e., C j=1 h(x j ) mod ( Zn i=1 cipn,i,j ,q) in F r : The complexity for this calculation is O((C − 1)M (r)). Thus, the total complexity of LW function becomes O(CM (r) log 2 q). This concludes the proof.
Noting that the computational complexity of calculating the original matrix multiplication is O(RCM (ψ)), where M (ψ) is the complexity of multiplication in F ψ . As seen, the complexity of the LW function is significantly low, compared to the original task. This means LW function provides security check with low complexity. However, the probability of attack detection using LW function could be as low as 50%, which may not be acceptable in some applications. Thus, we provide a heavy-weight integrity check tool (HW function) in the next section. Our ultimate goal is to use LW and HW functions together for higher attack detection probability while still having low computational complexity.
C. Heavy-Weight Integrity Check (HW Function)
The heavy-weight integrity check (HW function) uses Theorem 1 similar to the LW function, but chooses the coefficients c i from a larger field F q rather than {−1, 1}. This selection, i.e., choosing coefficients from a larger field, comes with larger attack detection probability and computational complexity as described next.
1) Probability of Attack Detection: Lemma 5: The probability that HW function detects a Byzantine attack with any attack pattern is expressed as
where q is the parameter of the hash function in (1) . Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] . As seen from Lemma 5, the attack detection probability increases with increasing q. Next, we present the computational complexity of HW function.
2) Computational Complexity: Theorem 6: The computational complexity of HW function for checking Z n packets calculated by w n is O(CZ n M (φ)). Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] .
We can approximate Z n to (R + )/N on average assuming that coded information packets are distributed homogeneously across workers, where R is the number of information packets, is the Fountain coding overhead, and N is the number of workers. Thus, the computational complexity of HW function across all workers becomes NO( C(R+ ) N M (φ)). As we discussed earlier, the computational complexity of the original matrix multiplication is O (RCM (ψ) ). We also note that M (ψ) >> M (φ). This means that even though HW function is computationally-complex as compared to LW function, it is still computationally-efficient with respect to the original matrix multiplication (considering that is small and approaches to 0 with increasing number of packets).
D. Light-versus Heavy-Weight Integrity Check
In this section, we investigate employing LW function multiple rounds/times to achieve higher attack detection probability with low computational complexity. LW function is used to check Z n packets computed by w n by selecting c i uniformly randomly from {−1, 1}. Let us call this the first round. In the second round, we can use LW function again, but selected values of c i will be different from the first round. Thus, if an attack is not detected in the first round, it may still be detected in the next round. Thus, using LW function over multiple rounds will increase the attack detection probability. The next theorem characterizes the performance of LW function when used in multiple rounds as compared to HW function.
Theorem 7: The attack detection probability of multipleround LW function is equal to the attack detection probability of HW function in (5) when LW function is used for log 2 (q) rounds. Furthermore, the computational complexity of log 2 (q)round LW function is lower than HW function if the following condition is satisfied.
Proof: The proof is provided in our technical report [19] .
IV. : SECURE CODED COOPERATIVE COMPUTATION
In this section, we present our secure coded cooperative computation () mechanism. consists of packet offloading, attack detection, and attack recovery modules.
A. Dynamic Packet Offloading
The dynamic packet offloading module of is based on [1] . In particular, the master offloads coded packets gradually to workers and receives two ACKs for each transmitted packet; one confirming the receipt of the packet by the worker, and the second one (piggybacked to the computed packet) showing that the packet is computed by the worker. Then, based on the frequency of the received ACKs, the master decides to transmit more/less coded packets to that worker. In particular, each packet p n,i is transmitted to each worker w n before or right after the computed packet p n,i−1 x is received at the master. For this purpose, the average per packet computing time E[β n,i ] is calculated for each worker w n dynamically based on the previously received ACKs. Each packet p n,i is transmitted after waiting E[β n,i ] from the time p n,i−1 is sent or right after packet p n,i−1 x is received at the master, thus reducing the idle time at the workers. This policy is shown to approach the optimal task completion delay and maximizes the workers' efficiency and is shown to improve task completion delay significantly compared with the literature [1] .
B. Attack Detection
Assume that the set of received packets from worker w n is Z n (Z n = |Z n |) at the master device at time t while the dynamic packet offloading process continues. If a new calculated packetỹ n,i is received, the following updates are made; Z n = Z n +1, and Z n = Z n ỹ n,i . The attack detection module of is applied on Z n periodically and consists of two phases.
The first phase applies LW function on the packets in Z n for any worker w n ∈ N. Let us assume that attack is detected in the packets coming from worker w n * . Then, all the packets in Z n * are discarded and the malicious worker w n * is removed from the set of workers, i.e., N = N − n * . As we discussed earlier, the attack detection probability of LW function increases with increasing corrupted packets. Thus, if an attack is detected in this phase, it can be considered that most of the packets are corrupted, so we can discard all the received packets.
The goal of the second phase is to detect any attacks, which are not detected in the first phase. Both HW and multipleround LW functions are used in this phase. In particular, if the inequality in Theorem 7 is satisfied, LW function is used for log 2 (q) times. Otherwise, HW function is used. If an attack is not detected, all the packets in Z n are labeled as verified packets. Otherwise, i.e., if an attack is detected, the attack recovery module, which is described later in this section, starts. The attack detection module stops when the number of verified packets from all workers reaches R + .
C. Attack Recovery
If an attack is detected in the second phase of the attack detection module of , we consider that a small number of packets are corrupted. Otherwise, the first phase of the attack detection module could have detected the attack and discarded all the packets. Thus, the goal of the attack recovery module is to recover from small number of corrupted packets without discarding all the packets.
Let us assume that an attack is detected among the packets received from w n * , i.e., in Z n * . In order to pinpoint the packets that are corrupted, we use a binary search algorithm. In particular, Z n * is divided into two disjoint sets; Z 1 n * and Z 2 n * . The second phase of the attack detection module is run over these two sets. If an attack is not detected on a given set, all the packets in that set are verified. Otherwise, the binary search (this set splitting) continues over the sets where an attack is detected. When the size of a splitted set is one, i.e., it has one packet in it, and an attack is detected, the packet in that set is declared a corrupted packet and is discarded. As seen, the attack recovery module can still verify some of the packets coming from a malicious worker. This is important to efficiently utilize available resources while still providing security guarantees.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm; Secure Coded Cooperative Computation () via simulations. We consider master/worker setup, where some of the workers are malicious. Each computed packet y n,i is corrupted by the malicious worker w n with probability ρ c . The computing resources are heterogeneous and vary across workers, where per packet computing delay β n,i is an i.i.d. random variable following a shifted exponential distribution. We compare with the baseline HW-only that uses HW function to detect corrupted packets, while uses both LW and HW functions gracefully. In HW-only, if a worker is detected as malicious, all the packets coming from that worker are discarded.
Task Completion Delay vs. Number of Malicious Workers. Fig. 1 compares the task completion delay of with HWonly for increasing number of malicious workers. The task completion delay is the time that takes to collect R + computed and verified packets (y n,i 's). In this setup, the total number of workers is N = 150, the number of rows in matrix A is R = 1K, the number of columns is C = 1K, the overhead of Fountain codes is 5%, the probability of packet corruption is ρ c = 0.3, and per-packet computing delay is a shifted exponential random variable with the mean selected uniformly between 1 and 6 for each worker.
The task completion delay of and HW-only increases with increasing number of malicious workers. When the number of malicious workers increases, there will be more corrupted packets in the system. These corrupted packets are detected and discarded by and HW-only. As more packets are discarded when the number of malicious workers is higher, the task completion delay increases. The increase in the task completion delay of is less than HW-only thanks to (i) using both LW and HW functions to reduce completion time and thus computational complexity, and (ii) attack recovery module of .
Task Completion Delay versus Packet Corruption Probability. Fig. 2 compares the task completion delay of with HWonly for different values of ρ c , the probability that a delivered packet by a malicious worker is corrupted. The number of workers, the number of rows in A, Fountain coding overhead, and per-packet computing delay are the same as the previous setup above. The number of malicious workers is N m = 50.
The task completion delay of HW-only does not change with increasing packet corruption probability. The reason is that HW-only does not have attack recovery feature and discards all the packets coming from a malicious worker. On the other hand, task completion delay of is significantly lower than HWonly especially when the packet corruption probability is low thanks to using both LW and HW functions and employing the attack recovery module. offloading these tasks to other devices for computation, has recently received a lot of attention, [1] - [13] . For example, coded cooperative computation is shown to provide higher reliability, smaller delay, and reduced communication cost in MapReduce framework [20] , where computationally intensive tasks are offloaded to distributed server clusters [21] . The effectiveness of coded computation in terms of task completion delay has been investigated in [1] , [7] , [11] . In [22] , the same problem is considered, but with the assumption that workers are heterogeneous in terms of their resources. In [1] , a dynamic and adaptive algorithm with reduced task completion time is introduced for heterogeneous workers. As compared to this line of work, we consider secure coded computation by focusing on Byzantine attacks. There is existing work at the intersection of coded computation and security by specifically focusing on privacy [2] , [23]- [25] . As compared to this line of work, we focus on Byzantine attacks and use homomorphic hash functions. Homomorphic hash functions have been widely used for transmission of network coded data. Corrupted network coded packets are detected by applying homomorphic hash functions that we consider in this work [14] . The hash function is applied to random linear combinations of network coded packets in [15] . , although similar to these work, is more efficient in terms of computational efficiency, which was not the main concern of [14], [15] as their focus was on transmitting network coded packets, not computation.
VI. RELATED WORK

VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on secure edge computing against Byzantine attacks. We considered a master/worker scenario where honest and malicious workers with heterogeneous resources are connected to a master device. We designed a secure coded cooperative computation mechanism () that provides both security and computation efficiency guarantees by gracefully combining homomorphic hash functions, and coded cooperative computation. Homomorphic hash functions are used against Byzantine attacks and coded cooperative computation is used to improve computation efficiency when edge resources are heterogeneous and time-varying. Simulations results show that improves task completion delay significantly.
